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Abstract
In the ‘real world’, dialogue systems typ-
ically are made to work long days in call-
centres of airlines and banks, fielding cus-
tomer queries (and often inviting customer
rage). In academia, a strong line of re-
search is aimed at making such systems
better at such tasks (in the hope of reduc-
ing customer annoyance). Here, I want
to explore potential uses of spoken di-
alogue systems not as members of the
workforce but in the lab, as a tool for
the cognitive sciences. I argue that dia-
logue systems can be employed as situ-
ated, implemented computational models
of language-capable agents; models whose
predictions can be evaluated in real-time in
ecologically valid settings, by human con-
versant. I sketch a methodology for build-
ing such models, propose areas where they
can best be employed, and discuss the re-
lations between research in this direction
and more applied research.
1 Introduction
(Pieraccini and Huerta, 2005) recently noted that
“there are three different lines of research in the
field of spoken dialogue”, one focusing on “un-
derstanding human communication, the second on
designing the interface for usable machines, and
the third on building those usable machines”. Col-
lapsing the latter two classes into one, we may la-
bel these views the tool-for-understanding and the
getting-things-done approaches.1
Interestingly, (Pieraccini and Huerta, 2005)
don’t give any references for whom they see as
1This of course reflects a classic dichotomy within the
field of artificial intelligence which goes by many names: en-
gineering vs. “empirical science concerned with the computa-
tional modeling of human intelligence” (Jordan and Russell,
1999); or, wrt. dialogue systems, “simulation” vs. “interface”
(Larsson, 2005), or just simply applied vs. pure research.
representing the first line of research. And on
closer inspection of the literature, there indeed
seems to be little work in the dialogue systems
community that would identify itself as belonging
solely to the tools-for-understanding camp (it’s a
different matter in the embodied agents commu-
nity).2 In this paper, I’d like to explore the prob-
lems and potential of the tool-for-understanding
direction and its relation to the getting-things-done
camp.
The paper is structured as follows: First, I
briefly review what computational cognitive mod-
els are and discuss how dialogue systems can be
seen as a special class thereof. Then, I discuss a
methodology for employing SDSs to address cog-
nitive questions, and areas that seem particularly
amenable to this methodology, given the current
state of the technology. I then discuss a number
of possible objections against the proposed use of
dialogue systems. I close with some thoughts on
the relation between the different uses for dialogue
systems, and a general discussion.
2 Dialogue Systems as Cognitive Models
How can dialogue systems, with all their well-
known technical problems and clumsy dialogue
behaviour possibly function as models of cogni-
tive abilities, and of which ones in any case? Be-
fore I address these questions, let us backtrack a
bit and briefly review what cognitive models actu-
ally are.
2.1 Levels of Analysis in Cognitive Models
In the most abstract sense, a model in the cognitive
sciences can be seen as a function from an agent’s
inputs to its outputs—typically, but not necessar-
2Recent examples of systems that seem to fall more on
the tool-for-understanding side (but that do not make clear
whether they see themselves as such) are (Allen et al., 1995;
Allen et al., 2000; DeVault and Stone, 2009; Skantze and
Schlangen, 2009).
ily, percepts and behaviours, respectively. In non-
trivial cases, this function will depend in some
way to the input (i.e., not be constant), and so can
be seen as specifying an information processor.
As Marr (1982) pointed out in his seminal work
on vision, such a function can be specified in dif-
ferent ways, which address different analytical in-
terests; his classification is shown here in Table 1.
A computational model is one which focuses on
the problem that is being solved by the processor,
i.e. only on the function in a mathematical sense.
A representational model adds concerns about the
exact way the processor computes the function;
an implementational model also worries about the
physical details of the processor.
A popular and fruitful recent line of research
puts a further constraint on models on the com-
putational level. With the, often tacit, assump-
tion that natural behaviours have evolved to be
near-optimal, they assume that agents act rational,
i.e. that they solve their computational problems
in an optimal way (minimizing their cost, max-
imizing their gain), given the available informa-
tion (Anderson (1991), see also Chater and Oaks-
ford (2008) for a recent overview). This direction
has the advantage of offering a clear mathemati-
cal basis for computational modeling (probability
theory, and more specifically Bayesian belief up-
dating); we will discuss below to what extent it
can support dialogue modeling.
Because it offers a convenient vocabulary to talk
about inputs, outputs, and everything in between,
we introduce here some central notions. The task
of the agent can in such a model be stated clearly:
it is to find that action at, given the observations of
the world ot−1, that has the best chance of bringing
the world to a desired state st+1.
I now try to situate dialogue systems within this
view of cognitive modelling.
2.2 Dialogue Systems: Situated
Computational Whole-Agent Models
First, a few words on what I mean by “dialogue
system”. Often, the term is used specifically for
mono-modal, voice-only systems that do rather
limited practical tasks, and is used somewhat in
opposition to conversational agent (seen as more
capable, but less oriented towards practical appli-
cations), multi-modal system (with more modal-
ities available to it) or embodied conversational
agents (with a simulated or real “body”, and con-
sequently also more modalities). I do not intend
such an opposition here, and use dialogue system
to cover all these kinds of systems; the defining
property here is that it is an (artificial) system that
can enter into and hold some, perhaps limited, but
in any case sustained form of (in the prototypi-
cal case) language-based interaction in real-time
with a human. I will argue that for our purposes
there are more commonalities between these dif-
ferent kinds of systems than is usually assumed,
and that even the humblest kind of system (voice-
only, not embodied) has to answer challenges that,
depending on how and with which focus they are
answered, can turn it into a cognitive model of an
interesting type.
Now, what kind of analysis can dialogue sys-
tems offer, and of what? Let’s first look at the task
environment in which a dialogue agent finds itself.
The information-processing task it needs to ad-
dress is the quite substantial one of understanding
language, and possibly a part of the world the con-
versation is about, well-enough to come up with a
reaction, possibly in language as well, that is ap-
propriate. (Note the restriction on well-enough; I
will come back to this later.) This is the first step
where dialogue systems can be usefully employed
in cognitive modelling: building such a system
forces one to precisely specify the task environ-
ment for (a particular setting of a) dialogue and
the phenomenon of interest.
Given a particular conversational competence
of interest (e.g., fast reaction times in turn-taking;
more on possible modeling targets below in Sec-
tion 3.2), a dialogue system can make, by embody-
ing a computational model of them, theories of
this competence testable. This property of mak-
ing the predictions of a theory testable is some-
thing that dialogue systems of course share with
any kind of computational model (for that is what
dialogue systems are, to finally relate the discus-
sion here to the previous section) in the cogni-
tive sciences. However, they do this in an unusual
way, by exposing themselves on-line to the situa-
tion type they are meant to model. With respect
to the task of language processing, dialogue sys-
tems are whole-agent models: they need to say
something about all levels of language process-
ing (however many one assumes), from perceiving
through understanding to generating it. This con-
trasts with the way for example theories of reading
time are evaluated, namely against pre-collected
Computational Theory Representation and algorithm Hardware implementation
What is the goal of the computation,
why is it appropriate, and what is the
logic of the strategy by which it can be
carried out?
How can this computational theory be
implemented? In particular, what is
the representation for the input and the
output, and what is the algorithm for
the transformation?
How can the representation and algo-
rithm be realized physically?
Figure 1: The three levels of analysis of information processing tasks of (Marr, 1982)
corpus data (see e.g. (Lewis and Vasishth, 2005));
these are what could be called sub-module models.
For us, this property of being a whole-agent
model is the ‘unique selling proposition’ of di-
alogue systems as tools-for-understanding. As
complete models (w.r.t. a certain ability, and other
constraints that will be discussed presently) of the
agent-type they are meant to model, they have to
produce a much wider range of behaviours than
sub-module models, and have to be explicit about
how these behaviours arise from that of the sub-
modules (assuming that they do have discernible
sub-modules). This is a challenge that can hardly
be addressed otherwise, as (Marr, 1982) noted:
“Almost never can a complex system of any kind
be understood as a simple extrapolation from the
properties of its elementary components”.
It’s not only the range of modelled behaviour
where dialogue systems can have an advantage
over off-line models, though. The kind of phe-
nomena that seem to be promising goals for tack-
ling in a dialogue system understood as cognitive
model (see next section) also seem hard to model
and evaluate otherwise. Decisions of an agent in a
dialogue (the at from Section 2.1) typically have
delayed rewards (how good was the conversation),
and complete models of the world (that is, models
of how the actions of the agent change the state
of the world, P (st|st−1, at), and of how the world
is perceived, P (ot|st)) are generally not available
and, given the size of the state space, hard to learn
from data—all of which suggests interactive eval-
uation as a strategy that is more promising than for
example trying to reproduce a gold-standard from
a corpus.3
The on-line nature of this interaction finally
makes dialogue systems an ideal tool for explor-
3Interestingly, in the line of research that uses Bayesian
methods like Reinforcement Learning to solve Partially-
Observable Markov Decision Processes (see Lemon and
Pietquin (2007) for a recent overview), a middle position
is taken: the systems learn by interacting with user models
which generate the observations, and which in turn are learnt
from data. In effect, this is what could be called a “semi-
interactive” setting, where two implemented models converse
which each other.
ing ideas from another recent approach within the
cognitive sciences: situated or embodied cogni-
tion: “the theory of situated cognition [...] claims
that every human thought and action is adapted
to the environment, that is situated, because what
people perceive, how they conceive of their activ-
ity, and what they physically do develop together.”
(Clancey, 1997, p.1). On-line interactions with di-
alogue systems inevitably happen in contexts, in
situations, embedded at the very least in time, if
not in space, and the systems need to address such
situational features.
Let’s wrap up the discussion of which of Marr’s
levels dialogue systems cover. As elaborated
above, dialogue systems clearly represent a com-
putational analysis: they contain a specification of
what it is that is being computed, what the compo-
nents of that computation are, and what the goals
are. They are also by definition implemented—
although most dialogue systems do not make any
claims about the cognitive plausibility of the rep-
resentations and algorithms they use. Lastly, most
likely dialogue systems will not any time soon be
able to tell us anything about the physical real-
isation of conversational skills, and hence aren’t
models on the physical level.
This then concludes this section: in the view
proposed here, Dialogue Systems are situated,
implemented whole-agent models of human lan-
guage processing capabilities, and are as such
computational cognitive models, perhaps with par-
tial claims to representational and algorithmic re-
alism as well.
3 Methodology and Domains
3.1 Of Robotic Bees and Conversational
Agents
In (Michelsen et al., 1992), an experiment is de-
scribed that represents the culmination of years
of research on communication among honeybees:
To test their understanding of the communica-
tion methods used by honeybees, the researchers
built a mechanical model of a forager bee, put
it in a typical communication situation (inside
a beehive), and let it perform various forms of
dances, implementing variants of the models of
bee-communication which the researchers had
previously built from observation. The effective-
ness of the dances (and hence the adequacy of the
theories) was then evaluated by the number of bees
that as a result flew to the predicted (communi-
cated) locations.
We envision a quite similar place for dialogue
systems in the study of human communication,
and a similar methodology: artificial agents em-
body a theory of communication, whose adequacy
is evaluated through the reactions it provokes in
a naturalistic setting. However, compared to the
honeybee, human communicative situations are
somewhat more varied, and there are interest-
ing interactions between technical limitations on
what can be computationally modelled and choice
of situation. The appropriate methodology then
looks more like the following: a) start from the-
ory that says something about phenomenon you
want to study; b) devise communicative setting
that keeps this phenomenon as unrestricted as pos-
sible while restricting other aspects as much as
possible; c) record humans in this setting; d) de-
rive from this a more fine-grained model, which is
e) implemented in computational model; f) evalu-
ate the model not only for how well it reproduces
the phenomenon but also for the reactions it pro-
vokes.4 (In practice, of course several iterations of
c) to f) may be necessary.)
We go through the most important steps in the
following.
3.2 Choice of Setting
The processing of human language poses quite
formidable technical challenges, and the extant
realisations even only of the sub-modules typi-
cally seen to be involved in it (e.g., parsing, “un-
derstanding”, generation) are miles away from
achieving human-like performance. This seems to
pose a problem: if the components are that bad,
how can we expect the result of their connection
to be anywhere near a usable model of human be-
haviour (as in, one that helps answer interesting
questions)?
The answer is, we shouldn’t. Or at least we
shouldn’t be expecting to be able to model unre-
4Steps c) to f) follow the methodology proposed by (Cas-
sell, 2007) for the construction of Embodied Conversational
Agents.
stricted, intelligent conversation. It is unrealistic
to expect dialogue systems to be able to model
“intelligent conversation” per se, that is, to ex-
pect them to be able to give “intelligent” replies
to all kinds of utterances. Luckily, there are two
(not mutually exclusive) ways around this prob-
lem. One is to restrict the setting in such a way
as to require “intelligent” (or, better, appropriate)
replies only in a narrow domain that can be mod-
elled. The other is to shift the focus to other fea-
tures of dialogue: Dialogue is not just about say-
ing and meaning the right things. It’s also about
saying the right things at the right moment, and
about giving the right kinds of other, not directly
task-related signals.
It seems then that, at least in the short term,
the most promising areas for modeling in dialogue
systems are not those of the dynamics of meaning
in dialogue, but that of the dynamics of interaction
(where it is an interesting open question as to how
much these can be disassociated). To give a laun-
dry list of possible areas in control of interactivity
that come to mind: turn-taking, timely feedback,
emotional feedback, alignment between conver-
sants. Also promising seems the study of emer-
gent behaviours, created by interactions (planned /
controlled or not) of parallel processes.
When the phenomenon of interest is selected
and explanatory theories are consulted or con-
structed, the next step is to devise a setting in
which the model can be evaluated. The challenge
I see here is to choose a situation that reduces as
much as possible the demands on the technical
components, while still being as much as possible
ecologically valid. The goal here is to externalise
and expose the limits that the system has (inso-
far as they aren’t part of what one wants to study)
and to turn them into constraints posed by the
situation (task, setting). E.g., a dialogue system
will have understanding problems (ASR, NLU),
so it’s a good idea to restrict the situation in such
a way that the space of expected interactions gets
smaller, and the restrictions are intuitively clear to
the human interactant.
To give an example for such a strategy (although
the authors do not explicitly phrase it like this): in
(Skantze and Schlangen, 2009), a system is pre-
sented that investigates how human-like levels of
interactivity / turn-taking speeds can be reached.
To investigate this, the authors restrict the situation
into which the system is put to dictation of number
sequences. This is a task that is intuitively under-
standable to human conversation partners, while
making technical tasks that are not the direct goal
of the investigation easier. (ASR can be expected
to perform better on such a limited vocabulary.)
A lot of the ingenuity of using dialogue sys-
tems to answer questions about human language
use will lie in the choice of restricted, but under-
standable settings.
3.3 Operationalisation, Model Construction
Once the setting has been determined and the gen-
eral predictions of the theory have been mapped
to it, the next step is to operationalise the theory
so that it can be modelled computationally. Us-
ing the vocabulary introduced above, the task is
to determine the range of actions that the system
is meant to be able to take, the observations that
are to be expected, and the state of the world that
is to be tracked. (An additional detail is whether
uncertainty about any of these elements should be
modelled as well.)
Forcing explicitness at this step already is some-
thing that dialogue systems can contribute to the
study of human language use. A functioning com-
putational model of an ability (say, turn-taking)
shows at least that the information given to it (say,
word sequences and prosodic information) con-
tains enough information to solve the computa-
tional problem.
In most current dialogue systems, the function
from observations to actions is specified proce-
durally, as the outcome of the combination (in a
pipeline, or partially parallel) of various process-
ing modules. This reflects on the one hand what
is seen as the structure of the problem—linguistics
has traditionally separated the task of language un-
derstanding into the “modules” of syntax / pars-
ing, semantics / interpretation and pragmatics
/ understanding—and on the other hand simply
good software engineering practice. It also allows
a more tentative approach, where less needs to be
explicitly stated about the structure of the prob-
lem than what would be needed in a purely ratio-
nal approach. (This of course can also be viewed
as a downside of this approach.) Finally, as briefly
mentioned above, it often is hard to get data from
which free parameters of a rational model could be
learned, and so analytical models with symbolic
rules provide more control over the algorithm.5
5But see (Miller et al., 1996; Lemon and Pietquin, 2007;
It should be noted here that for the level of
computational modeling, none of these differences
matter. What matters here is a clear understand-
ing of the problem; rational or probabilistic mod-
els perhaps have an advantage here because they
enforce a clearer statement. If one puts weight
on differences in processing mode, one starts to
enter the algorithmic / representational level; for
this to matter with respect to the modeling task,
one would then need to claim realism for one way
of processing or the other. Here again dialogue
systems promise to be a useful tool, by making
testable claims of advantages of different imple-
mentation methods.
The goal of studying human communication by
means of computational modeling also gives the
system designer the freedom to not fully imple-
ment those processing modules that aren’t meant
to be part of the model. For example, if the
aim of the model is the study of discourse struc-
ture, and logical forms are required as input of
the sub-module which is being tested, one could
try a setting where a human “wizard” (Wooffitt et
al., 1997) is in the loop—as long as this doesn’t
change the interactional dynamics one is inter-
ested in. Alternatively, an “oracle” could be em-
ployed: in a setting where what the human user
will talk about is known in advance, for example
because the user is asked to perform certain tasks,
this information can be given to some modules
of the system (unbeknown to the user) like refer-
ence resolver, speech recognition etc. Or, a system
that is meant to model interaction features can use
ELIZA-like techniques for content-management.
(Cf. the discussion of “micro-domains” in (Edlund
et al., 2008); more on this below.)
3.4 Evaluation
The final step is to evaluate the system for how
well it does its job of modeling the phenomenon
(and, more generally, of being ‘human-like’).
Evaluating dialogue systems is a difficult business,
as has often been discussed (Walker et al., 1998;
Edlund et al., 2008). The behaviour of a dialogue
system is the result of the combination of many
modules, and it is often difficult to ascertain which
module’s performance contributed what—asking
the human users directly will often not give mean-
ingful results.
Schuler et al., 2009 in press) for some attempts at (partially)
non-modular, probabilistic systems.
For using dialogue systems as tools-for-
understanding, we see three basic ways for evalua-
tion (which can be used together): First, if one has
an objective measure of the modelled phenomenon
available, one can treat the resulting interactions
of human subjects and dialogue system as a cor-
pus, and can compare the relevant measures in this
corpus with measures of corpora of human–human
interaction. Second, one can use subjective mea-
sures (user questionnaires) to evaluate the impres-
sion the system made. If one want to avoid asking
directly for the feature one wants to evaluate, an
indirect approach can be chosen where the evalu-
ation question is held constant (“did you find the
interaction similar to one with a human partner?”),
but the system is varied along the interesting di-
mension (i.e., is intentionally ‘disabled’ wrt. the
modelled phenomenon). Third, one can play or
show the finished interactions to other experiment
participants and let them evaluate the naturalness
(a so-called “overhearer evaluation”, (Whittaker
and Walker, 2006)).6
4 Possible Objections
“Creating a human-like dialogue system means
creating an Artificial Intelligence, and creating
an Artificial Intelligence is impossible!”7
There are two parts to this objection. We’ll deal
with the last one first. Is creating an AI possible?
The criticism in (Larsson, 2005), if I under-
stand it correctly, seems to turn on the assump-
tion (following Dreyfus (1992)) that “the back-
ground [necessary for understanding human lan-
guage] is not formalizable”. The claim is that this
applies both to attempts at explicitly formalising
such background (e.g., using databases of facts
and logical calculi to reason over them) as well as
to learning approaches, and that from this observa-
tion it follows that “computers will never achieve
human-level language understanding”. While the
position I’ve been advocating here does not re-
quire any claim about the possibility of human-
level language understanding (more on this in a
minute), I’d still like to note that I do not find the
conclusion compelling.
The basis of the criticism seems to be the sym-
bol grounding problem (see e.g. (Harnard, 1990)),
6(Cassell, 2007) provides interesting anecdotal evidence
of the use of this technique.
7A version of this objection has recently been raised in
this forum (Larsson, 2005), and so we discuss is a bit more
extensively here.
i.e. the problem of providing abstract symbols
with external, real-world meaning. In a quite
sweeping manner, (Larsson, 2005) sets the bar for
entry into the club of grounded beings high, and
counts among the experiences that are required
for understanding human language “being born
by parents, going through childhood and adoles-
cence and growing up and learning personal re-
sponsibility, social interaction”. I do not see how
a convincing in-principle argument can be formed
along these lines. Ultimately, this seems to me an
empirical question, and, pace (Wittgenstein, 1984
1953), I’d wait until I encounter a talking lion be-
fore I conclude whether I understand it or not.
Which brings me to the first part of the ob-
jection. Does the question whether building a
(human-level) AI is possible even matter? Clearly,
free conversation requires intelligence. Turing
(1950) famously proposed a conversational decep-
tion test (am I talking to man or machine?) as a test
for intelligence. But, as discussed above, human
language use is not restricted to holding free con-
versation (and convincing the conversational part-
ner one is human)—language is also used in other
settings, and there are other competences that can
be dissociated from this, and can be studied and
modelled independently.8 ,9
Evaluation of these competences then amounts
to running what could be called Particularised
Turing Tests: Can the system convince the user
that it is (like) a human operating under some,
possibly relatively strict, constraints? An example
could be a setting where the conversational partner
is only allowed to ask questions. Do the utterances
still come with a good timing? (The evaluation of
course does not have to be Turing test-style, ie. as
deception; see above for evaluation methodology.)
(Edlund et al., 2008) call such settings “micro-
domains”, and specify as evaluation goal whether
the system can be taken “for a human by some per-
son, under some set of circumstances”.
“Cognitive Science is about making predic-
tions, not engineering systems. Building dia-
logue systems is an engineering task.”
While the spoken dialogue systems technology
is far away from providing standard environments
8To Larsson’s (2005) credit, this is acknowledged in his
criticism.
9Cf. the Practical Dialogue Hypothesis in (Allen et al.,
2000): “The conversational competence required for practi-
cal dialogues, while still complex, is significantly simpler to
achieve than general conversational competence.”
like SOAR (Laird et al., 1987), components for
example for ASR (e.g., Sphinx4, (Walker et al.,
2004)) and dialogue managers (TRINDIkit, (Lars-
son and Traum, 2000)) are freely available. It
is however true that considerable effort has to be
spent on forming out of such components running
systems into which one can build the models that
are the primary interest. This can only get better if
research groups start to share resources on a larger
scale. Efforts to achieve this are currently under-
way (e.g., resources registry organised by SIG-
dial).
“You end up with bad cognitive science (too
many compromises to get it to work at all) and
bad engineering (too simple / useless domain)”
This is a serious objection. Attempting to use
dialogue systems technology, which is still quite
immature, can lead to making many compromises
to just getting some form of reliable behaviour at
all out the system. There is a danger of landing in
a no-mans land, building a system that is neither
particularly helpful in understanding the problems
faced by human language processors or advances
the state of technology. It is my opinion how-
ever that this can be avoided, and the methodology
sketched above can help towards doing so.
“You need at the very least eyes, arms and legs
to be cognitively plausible.”
This is a (slightly caricaturising) summary of
the central tenet of embodied cognition (Ander-
son, 2003). As mentioned above, I see dialogue
systems as in any case situated, as they function in
the same temporal environment as their conversa-
tion partner. When it comes to dealing with con-
tent, I am sympathetic with the view that ground-
ing of symbols in percepts is a useful approach;
however, as detailed above, not all of cognition
having to do with language use is about content.
“People interact differently with machines and
with humans, so machines have different com-
putational problem to solve.”
While there is evidence for the first part of the
objection (Fischer, 2006), this also seem to depend
on the metaphor with which human users enter
into the interaction (Edlund et al., 2008). More-
over, in any case it is unlikely that human language
users are even flexible enough to produce a funda-
mentally different kind of behaviour towards ar-
tificial conversational agents. The objection does
however point out that it is important to frame the
situation in which the model is evaluated carefully.
5 Dialogue Systems as Cognitive Models
and as Computer Interfaces
Both Pieraccini and Huerta (2005) and Larsson
(2005) point out that what we’ve called the tool-
for-understanding and the getting things done ap-
proaches are complementary. In what sense,
though? First, the differences. The directions an-
swer to different constraints, to differences in what
the free variables are. For cognitive models, the
goal has to be human-like performance (wrt. the
phenomenon being modelled), for practical sys-
tem, the primary goal has to be efficiency and ef-
fectiveness wrt. to the task—human-likeness may
or may not be a useful secondary goal. Conse-
quently, the modeler in the tool-for-understanding
view is free to choose a domain that lends itself
best to an as-isolated-as-possible study of a phe-
nomenon (see Section 3), while a researcher or
practitioner building an applied system is free to
implement behaviours that do not appear at all
human-like.
So much for the differences. A common inter-
est of course is to build components that help with
language processing. Good speech recognition for
example is as much a precondition for convincing
computational models of language use as it is one
for good practical systems. The overlap goes fur-
ther, though. The already briefly mentioned work
on POMDPs (Lemon and Pietquin, 2007) for ex-
ample is, although being pursued more from an
applied perspective, highly interesting also from
a cognitive modeling perspective, as it uses tech-
niques that can guarantee optimal computations.10
To conclude this section, I’d like to propose,
with (Larsson, 2005), that “it would be good prac-
tice to explicitly state what the goals of a certain
piece of research are”, namely whether one wants
to investigate human language use, using dialogue
systems as a tool, or whether one wants to improve
human–computer interaction.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I have discussed the potential and
possible problems of using spoken dialogue sys-
tems (ecumenically understood as all kinds of ar-
10Interestingly, there is some reservation against such
methods from a commercial perspective (Paek and Pierac-
cini, 2008), where the additional constraint of provability of
dialogue strategies seems to be important for customers who
employ such systems.
tificial systems that can interact via spoken natu-
ral language) as models of (certain aspects of) hu-
man cognition. I have sketched a methodology for
doing so, proposing that the main use of dialogue
systems for now lies in how they can help being
more explicit about one structures the tasks.
The models that can be built at the moment are
rather crude and limited, and necessarily contain-
ing many simplifications. The hope is that com-
bined efforts on practical systems and on systems
built as tools-for-understanding can improve both
kinds of systems, and help advance our under-
standing of human language use.
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